
“Can managerial superiority explain high executive pay in large firms? Evidence ” by Peter L. SWAN
Authors:
Peter L. SWAN
University of New South WalesTeddy OETOMO
The University of Sydney
We present the first empirical evidence in support of Rosen’s (1982) ‘cloning’ hypothesis, explaining the firm size-executive pay effect in terms of a predicted greater superiority of managerial talent the larger is the firm. We show that executives from better performing firms are more likely to join larger firms. Moreover, a misspecification arises if actual firm size is used in pay-performance sensitivity estimation. A significantly smaller size effect on pay results after correcting for specification bias. Remarkably, the prior performance of the firm that previously employed the executive is a more significant determinant of the executive’s pay with the current employer than is current firm performance during the tenure of the executive in her new company.