Events

Authors:

• Chongmin KIM
  Kookmin University

• Kam-Chau WONG
  Chinese University of Hong Kong

We re-examine the robustness of the KMR process [5] for selecting Nash equilibria with respect to the manipulation of adding or eliminating dominated (or even totally dominated) strategies. We show that any strict Nash equilibrium for a given normal form game can be selected as a unique long rum equilibrium under the KMR process for the new game that is obtained from the given game by adding a (totally) dominated strategy. In this sense, dominated strategies do matter in selecting long run equilibria even though they can never be a part of them. In response to this negative result, we introduce a state dependent mutational process called the hierarchic process and show that the stochastic long run equilibria of such a process are generically robust with respect to adding or eliminating totally dominated strategies.