Shiyang Huang
Dr. Shiyang HUANG
Assistant Professor

3917 8564

KK 834

Academic & Professional Qualification

  • Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science
  • M.A., Tsinghua University
  • B.A., Tsinghua University


Dr. Shiyang HUANG received his Ph.D. degree in finance from the London School of Economics in 2015.  He also holds a master degree and a bachelor degree in economics from Tsinghua University.  He joined The University of Hong Kong in 2015.

Shiyang’s research agenda focuses on financial economics and empirical asset pricing.  He has published research papers in several academic journals including Journal of Financial Economics, Management Science and Journal of Economic Theory.  He also won the best paper awards at academic conferences, including Best Paper Award at 7th Melbourne Asset Pricing Meeting, Conference Best Paper Award at China International Conference in Finance of 2019, Best Paper Award at 14th Annual Conference in Financial Economics Research by Eagle Labs (IDC) of 2017, Yihong Xia Best Paper Award at hina International Conference in Finance of 2015, Conference Best Paper Award at Paris December Finance Meeting of 2014,  IdR QUANTVALLEY / FdR Quantitative Management Initiative Research Award of 2013.

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Research Interest

  • Financial Economics
  • Asset Pricing
  • Information Economics

Selected Publications

  • “The Rate of Communication” (with Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Dong Lou), Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
  • “Public Market Players in the Private World: Implications for the Going-Public Process” (with Yifei Mao, Cong (Roman) Wang and Dexin Zhou), The Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
  • “Speed Acquisition” (with Bart Zhou Yueshen), Management Science, forthcoming
  • “Innovation and Informed Trading: Evidence from Industry ETFs” (with Maureen O’Hara and Zhuo Zhong), The Review of Financial Studies, 34(3), 2021, 1280-1316
  • “Offsetting Disagreement and Security Prices” (with Byoung-Hyoun Hwang, Dong Lou and Chengxi Yin), Management Science, 66(8), 2020, 3444-3465
  • “Institutionalization, Delegation, and Asset Prices” (with Zhigang Qiu and Liyan Yang), Journal of Economic Theory, 186, 2020, 104977
  • “Attention Allocation and Return Co-movement: Evidence from Repeated Natural Experiments” (with Yulin Huang and Tse-Chun Lin), Journal of Financial Economics, 132(2), 2019, 369-383

Recent Publications

The Cost of Distraction

What could be the result if some compelling opportunities, like lottery jackpots, were potentially lucrative enough to distract the investors' attention from monitoring the stock market?

Innovation and Informed Trading: Evidence from Industry ETFs

We empirically examine the impact of industry exchange-traded funds (IETFs) on informed trading and market efficiency. We find that IETF short interest spikes simultaneously with hedge fund holdings on the member stock before positive earnings surprises, reflecting long-the-stock/short-the-ETF activity. This pattern is stronger among stocks with high industry risk exposure. A difference-in-difference analysis on the ETF inception event shows that IETFs reduce post-earnings-announcement drift more among stocks with high industry risk exposure, suggesting that IETFs improve market efficiency. We also find that the short interest ratio of IETFs positively predicts IETF returns, consistent with the hedging role of IETFs.

Offsetting Disagreement and Security Prices

We propose that investor beliefs frequently “cross” in the sense that an investor may like company A but dislike company B, whereas another investor may like company B but dislike company A. Such belief-crossing makes it almost impossible to construct a portfolio that is composed solely of every investor’s most favored companies. This causes the level of excitement for portfolios to be generally lower than the levels of excitement that individual companies generate among their most fervent supporters. Coupled with short-sale constraints, wherein prices are set by the most optimistic investors, this causes portfolios to trade at discounts. Utilizing several settings whereby the value of a portfolio and the values of the underlying components can be evaluated separately (e.g., closed-end funds), we present evidence supporting our proposition that, in financial markets, the “whole” is often less than the “sum of its parts.”

Institutionalization, Delegation, and Asset Prices

We study the effects of institutionalization on fund manager compensation and asset prices. Institutionalization raises the performance-sensitive component of the equilibrium contract, which makes institutional investors effectively more risk averse. Institutionalization affects market outcomes through two opposing effects. The direct effect is to bring in more informed capital, and the indirect effect is to make each institutional investor trade less aggressively on information through affecting the equilibrium contract. When there are many institutions and little noise trading in the market, the indirect contracting effect dominates the direct informed capital effect in determining market variables such as the cost of capital, return volatility, price volatility, and market liquidity. Otherwise, the direct informed capital effect dominates.

Attention allocation and return co-movement: Evidence from repeated natural experiments

We hypothesize that when investors pay less attention to financial markets, they rationally allocate relatively more attention to market-level information than to firm-specific information, leading to increases in stock return co-movements. Using large jackpot lotteries as exogenous shocks that attract investors’ attention away from the stock market, we find supportive evidence that stock returns co-move more with the market on large jackpot days. This effect is stronger for stocks preferred by retail investors and is not driven by gambling sentiment. We also find that stock returns are less sensitive to earnings surprises and co-move more with industries on large jackpot days.