Dr. Stephen CHING
Associate Professor

2857 8504

KK 1013


Stephen Ching did his undergraduate and master in economics at The University of Hong Kong; PhD at the University of Rochester, where he was awarded with the Conibear Prize. He left the City University of Hong Kong and returned to his alma mater in 2002.

His research is related to different areas in economics, which include game theory, mechanism design, industrial organization, and international economics. He has published in the Economics Letters, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Review of International Economics, and Social Choice and Welfare. His papers have also appeared in the Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation and Pacific Economic Review, as a result of invited submissions.

His research activities extend outside the academia. He is the first Hong Kong academic appointed as a research fellow by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. He was the senior consultant of the project, An Extended Study of the Key Economic Characteristics of Indirect Taxes in Hong Kong, commissioned by the Government of the HKSAR. He was also appointed as consultants by the Hong Kong Coalition of Service Industries, Pacific Basin Economic Council, and the former Hongkong Telecom.

He is the only economic professor in Hong Kong who is a CFA charterholder. He also holds the title of Financial Risk Manager (FRM). He has been invited to give professional workshops at the Central University of Finance of Economics, Renmin University, Research Institute of Tsinghua University in Shenzhen, and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

Selected Publications

  • “Contestability of the Urban Land Market: An Event Study of Hong Kong Land Auctions”,
    (with Yuming Fu), Regional Science and Urban Economics, forthcoming.
  • “A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rule”,
    (with Shigehiro Serizawa), Journal of Economic Theory, 78(1), January 1998, pp.157-166.
  • “Strategy-Proofness and ‘Mdian Voters'”,
    International Journal of Game Theory, 26(4), 1997, pp.473-490.
  • “A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule”,
    Journal of Economic Theory , 71(1), October 1996, pp.298-302.
  • “An Alternative Characterization of the Uniform Rule”,
    Social Choice and Welfare, 11(2), April 1994, pp.131-136.