Prof. Tingjun LIU

2857 8512

KK 1002

Academic & Professional Qualification

  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University
  • Ph.D., University of Virginia
  • B.S., Peking University


Prof. Tingjun Liu received his Ph.D. in Financial Economics from Carnegie Mellon University in 2007.  He also holds a B.S. in Physics from Peking University, and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Virginia. Prior to joining The University of Hong Kong, Tingjun taught at Renmin University of China and Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business.

Tingjun’s research interests include theoretical corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and auction theory. His work on mergers and acquisitions shows that if an acquiring firm does not have enough cash to pay for the acquisition — and hence needs to obtain financing after winning, the acquirer will offer a premium to the target firm. Such a premium signals a high quality of the acquirer and facilitates the post-acquisition financing, the benefit of which outweighs the cost of a higher acquisition price. His research on auction theory focuses on security-bid auctions — auctions in which bidders pay with securities that are claims to project revenues. Security-bid auctions are more complicated than cash auctions because the value of securities depends on the bidder’s private information. Tingjun explores how a seller can overcome such complications to best design security-bid auctions. He also studies the strategic nondisclosure in management buyout, showing how nondisclosure can create a winner’s curse, and via this channel increased competition can reduce shareholder payoffs. Externally, he serves on the program committees of leading international conferences including Western Finance Association meetings, European Finance Association meetings, and Midwest Finance Association conferences.

Research Interest

  • Theoretical Corporate Finance
  • Mergers and Acquisitions
  • Auction Theory

Selected Publications

  • “Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt), Journal of Finance, 2021, forthcoming.
  • “Costly Auction Entry, Royalty Payments, and the Optimality of Asymmetric Designs,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt and Takeharu Sogo), Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 188, 105041.
  • “Optimal Equity Auctions with Two-dimensional Types,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt), Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, 184, 104913.
  • “Targeting Target Shareholders,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt and Robert Marquez), Management Science, 2018, 64(4): 1489-1509.
  • “Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt and Takeharu Sogo), American Economic Review, 2016, 106(11): pp. 3577-89.
  • “Optimal Equity Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders,”
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 166, pp. 94-123.
  •  “Takeover Bidding with Signaling Incentives”,
    The Review of Financial Studies, 2012, 25(2), pp. 522-556.
  • “Hedging and Competition,”
    (with Christine Parlour), Journal of Financial Economics, 2009, 94(3), pp. 492-507.

Awards and Honours

  • General Research Fund awards (PI) for three consecutive years, Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, 2017-2019
  • UG Teaching Reward, Faculty of Business and Economics, Hong Kong University, 2018
  • Featured article, Targeting Target Shareholders,  Management Science, 2018
  • Research Output Prize, Faculty of Business and Economics, Hong Kong University, 2017